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State v. Beale and the Killing of a Viable Fetus: An Exercise in
Statutory Construction and the Potential for Legislative Reform
Medical knowledge of fetal development has increased at a startling pace in
recent years.1 The growth of medical technology has forced courts to reexamine
the legal status of the fetus. As recently as 1987, the North Carolina Supreme
Court construed the term "person" to include a viable fetus under the North
Carolina Wrongful Death Act. 2 Only two years later, however, the same court
refused to extend the protection of the criminal law of homicide to the unborn.
In State v. Beale3 the North Carolina Supreme Court chose instead to adopt an
ancient common-law rule requiring proof of live birth for a murder conviction
based on the death of a child resulting from injuries sustained in the womb.4
This Note analyzes the court's decision in Beale and traces the development
of the "born alive rule"5 from its creation in the middle ages to its reaffirmation
in the twentieth century. The Note concludes that the Beale court reached the
correct result, but criticizes the court's incomplete statutory analysis. The Note
also examines legislative attempts in other jurisdictions to ameliorate the com-
mon-law rule and suggests a statutory approach to punish violence against the
unborn.
On the night of December 17, 1986, Donald Ray Beale, Jr. fired a shotgun
at the head of his pregnant wife, Donna Faye Beale, as she started to enter her
home. 6 At the time, Mrs. Beale was twelve days past her due date, and had been
having contractions earlier in the day.7 After the shooting, Donna Beale was
taken to a local hospital where she and her unborn child were pronounced dead
on arrival.8
On August 31, 1987, the Grand Jury of Cumberland County indicted Beale
for the murders of his estranged wife and of "Baby Girl Beale, a human being, a
viable but unborn child." 9 Beale moved to dismiss the second count of the in-
1. See generally Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other
LegalAnachronisms, 21 VAL. U.L. REv. 563, 576 (1987) (noting "scientific revolution" in obstetrics
and fetology within the last 15 years).
2. DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 427-28, 358 S.E.2d 489, 491-92 (1987) (construing
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984)).
3. 324 N.C. 87, 376 S.E.2d 1 (1989).
4. Id. at 92-93, 376 S.E.2d at 3-4.
5. Courts and commentators generally refer to the common-law rule excluding unborn chil-
dren from the class of potential victims of murder as "the born alive rule." See, eg., id. at 90, 376
S.E.2d at 2; Forsythe, supra note 1, at 563.
6. Brief for the State at 2-3, Beale (No. 64PA88). According to the Fayetteville police, the
couple had separated after marital problems. Pregnant Woman Slain, The Fayetteville Observer,
Dec. 18, 1986, at lB, col. 1.
7. Brief for the State at 3, Beale (No. 64PA88). According to an obstetrician who examined
her on the morning of the shooting, Mrs. Beale had been having contractions at 10- to 15-minute
intervals. Id. at 2-3. The doctor also testified that the unborn child was alive at the time of the
examination. Id. at 3.
8. Id. An autopsy attributed the death of the fetus to the mother's loss of circulation. Id. The
pathologist also testified that the unborn child was a normal, nine-pound, four-ounce baby girl. Id.
In the pathologist's opinion, the unborn child was a viable fetus at the time of the shooting. Id.
9. Beale, 324 N.C. at 88, 376 S.E.2d at 1. The indictment of August 31 superseded a previous
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dictment, claiming that the killing of a fetus does not constitute murder under
North Carolina law.10 Following a hearing, the trial court denied Beale's mo-
tion.1  Beale sought interlocutory review of the trial court's ruling by petition-
ing for a writ of certiorari. 12
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide "whether
the unlawful, willful and felonious killing of a viable but unborn child is murder
within the meaning of [North Carolina General Statutes section] 14-17."' 13 Re-
fusing to extend the common-law definition of murder to encompass the killing
of a viable fetus, the supreme court reversed the denial of Beale's motion to
dismiss.14 The court rejected the State's argument that North Carolina should
abandon the common-law born alive rule in light of "advances in medical tech-
nology which enable the State to show with certainty the viability and cause of
death of the unborn child." 15
With Beale the North Carolina Supreme Court became the latest court to
address an issue that has plagued judges and commentators for centuries.
Although modem courts take the born alive rule for granted, the criminal law's
recognition of crimes against the unborn has been debated since the middle
ages. 16 Writing during the reign of King Henry III, but reflecting the Roman
canon law of the thirteenth century, common-law scholar Henry de Bracton
viewed the killing of a "quickened" 17 fetus as homicide.18 In contrast, Bracton's
contemporary, Andrew Home, distinguished between infants "slain en ventre sa
mere" 19 and those killed "after birth."20 In Home's view, only the latter were
victims of murder "for no one can be adjudged an infant until he has been seen
in the world so that it be known whether he is a monster or no."21 Recognizing
indictment, which charged that Beale murdered Donna Faye West Beale in violation of North Caro-
lina General Statutes section 14-17; and "unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did employ an instru-
ment, a 410 shotgun, on Donna Faye West Beale, a pregnant woman, by firing... with intent to
destroy the unborn child, in violation of North Carolina General Statutes section 14-44." Id. For a
discussion of the relationship between the murder and abortion statutes, see infra text accompanying
notes 106-12.
10. Beale, 324 N.C. at 88, 376 S.E.2d at 1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1988)). For the text of § 14-17, see infra note 75.
14. Beale, 324 N.C. at 93, 376 S.E.2d at 4.
15. Id. at 90, 376 S.E.2d at 2.
16. For an examination of the early common law's treatment of crimes against the unborn, see
Forsythe, supra note 1, at 580-92, and Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the
Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411 (1968).
17. Modem courts define "quickening" as "the first recognizable movement of the fetus in
utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
132 (1973); see also State v. Forte, 222 N.C. 537, 539, 23 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1943) (describing quicken-
ing as "the first motion of the fetus in the womb felt by the mother, occurring usually about the
middle of the term of pregnancy").
18. Bracton wrote: "If one strikes a pregnant women or gives her poison in order to procure an
abortion, if the foetus is already formed or quickened, especially if it is quickened, he commits homi-
cide." 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 341 (G. Woodbine ed. 1968).
19. "In its mother's womb." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 479 (5th ed. 1979).
20. 3 A. HORNE, THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES 139 (Selden Society ed. 1895).
21. Id. Home's concerns are no longer relevant in light of current medical technology, which
enables physicians to establish conclusively the existence of a live fetus within the womb. See infra
text accompanying notes 34-37.
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a related evidentiary concern, sixteenth-century scholar William Stanford ac-
cepted the born alive rule "because it is difficult to judge.., whether the child
died of this battery of its mother or through another cause."'22
By the seventeenth century, the common law of homicide fully embraced
the born alive rule.23 Sir Edward Coke maintained that the killing of a quick,
but unborn, child "is a great misprision, and no murder; but if the childe be born
alive and dieth ... this is murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable crea-
ture, in rerum natura, when it is born alive." 24 In his Commentaries, Sir Ed-
ward Blackstone reiterated the born alive rule, closely following Coke's
language. 25 Considering the tremendous influence of Coke and Blackstone on
early American common law, it is not surprising that American courts uni-
formly adopted the born alive rule during the nineteenth century.26 By 1850 the
English common-law rule "had long been accepted in the United States." '27
Although American courts invariably adopted the born alive rule without
examining its purpose, 28 scholars generally attribute the rule to the technologi-
cal inability to prove the corpus delicti29 of the homicide of an unborn child. 30
In other words, "[tihe 'rule' is generally understood to derive from the impossi-
bility, 300 years ago, of determining whether and when a fetus was living and
when and how it died."'31 High infant mortality rates32 also led the courts to
adopt a presumption that an unborn child would not be born alive.33
Although medical science was unable to establish conclusively the existence
22. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right
About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law
Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 340 (1971) (translating W. STANFORD, LES PLEES DEL CORON, Book I,
ch.13 (1557)).
23. See Regina v. Sims, 75 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1076 (K.B. 1601).
24. 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *50. The term in rerum natura means
"in the nature of things; in the realm of actuality; in existence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 714
(5th ed. 1979).
25. "To kill a child in it's mother's womb, is now no murder, but a great misprision: but if the
child be born alive, and dieth by reason of the potion or bruises it received in the womb, it seems, by
the better opinion, to be murder." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *198.
26. Several American courts cited Coke and Blackstone in support of the born alive rule. See,
eg., Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 7, 23 So. 671, 674 (1898); State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52, 54 (1849).
27. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 627, 470 P.2d 617, 621, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 485
(1970).
28. See Forsythe, supra note 1, at 597-98.
29. "The 'corpus delicti' of a crime is the body or substance of the crime, which ordinarily
includes two elements: the act and the criminal agency of the act." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 310
(5th ed. 1979); see also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 4 (1972) (dis-
cussing components of the corpus delicti requirement).
30. See Forsythe, supra note 1, at 590. To establish the corpus delicti of homicide, "there must
be a showing of death and that the death resulted from the criminal act or agency of another." Lane
v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 509, 514, 248 S.E.2d 781, 783 (1978).
31. People v. Guthrie, 417 Mich. 1006, 1008, 334 N.W.2d 616, 617 (1983) (Ryan, J., dissenting
from order vacating leave to appeal).
32. One early nineteenth-century commentator observed that "on an average, one child in six-
teen, or between that number and twenty, is usually dead before delivery." J. CHiTrY, A PRACTI-
CAL TREATISE ON MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 416 (1st Am. ed. 1835).
33. See A. DEAN, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 168 (1854); see also People v.
Greer, 79 Il1. 2d 103, 112, 402 N.E.2d 203, 207 (1980) (early judges rationalized the born alive rule
"by creating a presumption that the fetus would die in childbirth").
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of a live fetus or the cause of an unborn child's death until the middle of the
twentieth century, recent advances in medical technology make these determina-
tions routine. "Today it is undisputed that medicine is generally able to prove
the corpus delicti of the homicide of the unborn child."'34 Physicians can estab-
lish the existence and gestational age of a live fetus by fetal heart monitoring,
sonography, and other techniques. 35 As was the case in Beale,36 today's medical
science can determine the proximate cause of a fetal death.37 "Moreover, birth
itself is no longer a violent perilous adventure. Current statistics indicate that
the fetal survival rate after twenty weeks of gestation is ninety-nine percent."'3 8
These advancements in obstetrics and forensics have forced courts to reex-
amine the protection afforded unborn children under the law. In what Professor
Prosser called "the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the
whole history of the law of torts,"'39 a majority of jurisdictions now recognize a
wrongful death action based on the death of an unborn child.4° In doing so,
courts construe the terms "person" or "human being" in the various wrongful
death statutes to include a viable fetus, thereby entitling the unborn to the same
protection afforded the born.41 For example, when the North Carolina Supreme
Court first recognized the tort of wrongful death of a viable fetus, the court
explained: "A viable fetus ... is undeniably alive and undeniably human. It is,
by definition, capable of life independent of its mother. A viable fetus is geneti-
cally complete and can be taxonomically distinguished from non-human life
forms."'4 2 Despite the recognition of viable fetuses as persons in the tort context,
courts have not been as willing to extend the protection of the criminal law to
the unborn.
With the court's decision in Beale, North Carolina became the thirtieth
state to adopt the born alive rule by judicial decision in a criminal case.4 3 In at
34. Forsythe, supra note 1, at 579.
35. F. CUNNINGHAM, P. McDONALD & N. GANT, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 19-20 (18th ed.
1989).
36. See supra note 8.
37. See, eg., Brief for the State at 3, Beale (No. 64PA88) (autopsy establishing loss of mother's
circulation as cause of fetal death); see also State v. Trudell, 243 Kan. 29, 30, 755 P.2d 511, 512
(1988) ("abnormal trauma... had torn the placenta, blocking the blood supply to the fetus and
resulting in its death"); People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226, 228, 293 N.W.2d 775, 776 (1980) (the
"infant bled to death" after placental abruption resulting from trauma received in automobile acci-
dent), appeal denied, 417 Mich. 1006, 334 N.W.2d. 616 (1983).
38. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. at 232, 293 N.W.2d at 778 (quoting State's brief).
39. W. PROSSER, LAw OF ToRrs 336 (4th ed. 1971).
40. See Note, DiDonato v. Wortman and Wrongful Death of a Viable Fetus in North Carolina:
The Case Against Unreasonably Restricting Damages, 66 N.C.L. RaV. 1291, 1299 (1988) (noting that
35 jurisdictions had recognized wrongful death actions on behalf of viable fetuses by 1986).
41. See, eg., DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987); Verkennes v.
Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). For a complete list of cases construing wrongful
death statutes to include viable fetuses, see Note, supra note 40, at 1291-92 n.6.
42. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 427, 358 S.E.2d at 491. The Beale court did not acknowledge this
statement. Instead, the court attempted to distinguish DiDonato in a footnote, stating that the
DiDonato court reached its conclusion "after considering the language of the Wrongful Death Act,
its legislative history, and the statute's broadly remedial objectives." Beale, 324 N.C. at 90 n.3, 376
S.E.2d at 2 n.3; ef. infra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing different rules of construction for
remedial and penal statutes).
43. See Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 67 (1898); Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 722
1990] 1147
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
least eleven of these cases, the courts adopted the rule despite medical evidence
indicating the cause of fetal death.44 Although some states have overturned the
rule to some degree by statute,45 only two states have done so by judicial fiat. 46
Even in those jurisdictions that have abandoned the live-birth requirement in the
tort context, courts continue to apply the born alive rule in homicide cases. 47
These courts typically note this inconsistency, but dismiss it with little hesita-
tion, often pointing out that remedial statutes are to be construed liberally,
whereas criminal statutes are governed by a rule of strict construction. 48
S.W.2d 584 (1987); Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970);
State v. Anonymous, 40 Conn. Supp. 498, 516 A.2d 156 (1986); State v. McCall, 458 So. 2d 875 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); White v. State, 238 Ga. 224, 232 S.E.2d 57 (1977); People v. Greer, 79 11. 2d
103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519 (1876); State v. Trudell, 243 Kan. 29,
755 P.2d 511 (1988); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983); State v. Brown, 378 So.
2d 916 (La. 1980); People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980), appeal denied,
417 Mich. 1006, 334 N.W.2d 616 (1983); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985); Taylor v.
State, 108 Miss. 18, 66 So. 321 (1914); State v. Doyle, 205 Neb. 234, 287 N.W.2d 59 (1980); State in
the Interest of A.W.S., 182 NJ. Super. 278, 440 A.2d 1144 (1981); State v. Willis, 98 N.M. 771, 652
P.2d 1222 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949); State v.
Beale, 324 N.C. 87, 376 S.E.2d 1 (1989); State v. Sogge, 36 N.D. 262, 161 N.W. 1022 (1917); State v.
Dickinson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971); State v. McKee, I Add. 1 (Pa. 1791); State v.
Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257 (R.I. 1982); State v. Evans, 745 S.W.2d 880 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987); Harris
v. State, 28 Tex. App. 308, 12 S.W. 1102 (1889), later appeal; State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah
1978); Lane v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 509, 248 S.E.2d 781 (1978); State ex rel. Atkinson v. Wilson,
332 S.E.2d 807 (W. Va. 1985); Huebner v. State, 131 Wis. 162, 111 N.W. 63 (1907); Bennett v. State,
377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963).
44. See, eg., Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 623, 470 P.2d 617, 618, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481,
482 (1970) (skull fracture); State v. Anonymous, 40 Conn. Supp. 498, 505, 516 A.2d 156, 157 (1986)
(loss of mother's circulation); People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 109, 402 N.E.2d 203, 206 (1980)
(injuries resulting from beating); State v. Trudell, 243 Kan. 29, 30, 755 P.2d 511, 512 (1988) (torn
placenta); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61, 61-62 (Ky. 1983) (injuries resulting from bat-
tery); People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226, 228, 293 N.W.2d 775, 776 (1980) (torn placenta),
appeal denied, 417 Mich. 1006, 334 N.W.2d. 616 (1983); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 627 (Minn.
1985) (intercranial hemorrhage); Brief for the State at 3, Beale, (No. 64PA88) (loss of mother's
circulation); State v. Dickinson, 28 Ohio St.2d 65, 66, 275 N.E.2d 599, 600 (1971) (hypoxia due to
placental hemorrhage); State v. Evans, 745 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (asphyxiation
resulting from placental abruption); State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Utah 1978) (traumatic
blow).
45. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) (defining murder as "the unlawful killing
of a human being or afetus, with malice aforethought" (emphasis added)); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 9-1.2 (Supp. 1989) (creating the crime of "Intentional homicide of an unborn child"); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266-268 (West 1987) (establishing separate, comprehensive homicide statutes
encompassing unborn children). For a discussion of legislative attempts to abolish the born alive
rule, see infra text accompanying notes 116-135.
46. See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378, 536 N.E.2d 571 (1989) (post-Beale deci-
sion including viable fetus as "person" for purpose of common-law crime of murder); Common-
wealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984) (construing vehicular homicide statute to
encompass killing of viable fetus); State v. Home, 282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984) (extending
common-law definition of murder to include viable fetus).
47. See infra note 48.
48. For example, the Beale court noted the wrongful death statute's "broadly remedial objec-
tives." Beale, 324 N.C. at 90 n.3, 376 S.E.2d at 2 n.3. In contrast, the court emphasized that
"[c]riminal statutes must be strictly construed." Id. at 93, 376 S.E.2d at 4 (citations omitted); see
also People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 115, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (1980) ("Differing objectives and
considerations in tort and criminal law foster... different principles governing the same factual
situation."); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn. 1985) ("This court may... fashion a remedy
for a civil wrong... [but] ... is forbidden to use its common law power to fashion crimes for public
wrongs."); State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257, 1259 (R.I. 1982) (Wrongful death statute was "properly
subject to a liberal application," whereas homicide statute must "be narrowly construed."). But see
State v. Horne, 282 S.C. 444, 447, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1984) ("It would be grossly inconsistent for
1148 [Vol. 68
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The rule requiring strict construction of penal statutes "is perhaps not
much less old than construction itself."49 The rule rests "on the fear that expan-
sive judicial interpretations will create penalties not originally intended by the
legislature." 50 Plainly stated, the rule requires courts to construe criminal laws
in favor of the accused. Merely stating the rule, however, does not end the in-
quiry. The rule does not relieve a court from its duty to construe the statute in
question, nor does it "mean that a criminal statute should be construed stint-
ingly or narrowly. '5 1 As the North Carolina Supreme Court once stated,
"[w]hile a criminal statute must be strictly construed, the courts must neverthe-
less construe it with regard to the evil which it is intended to suppress." 52
A related proposition often cited in support of retaining the born alive rule
is the constitutional guarantee against undue surprise afforded criminal defend-
ants by the due process clause.5 3 As one court noted, "[t]he first essential of
due process is fair warning of the act which is made punishable as a crime."
'54
This notion of fair warning stems from the federal constitution's prohibition of
ex post facto laws, 55 which protects individuals against punishment for an act
that was not criminal when performed. Although the ex post facto prohibition
"applies only to legislative acts and not to judicial decisions,"'56 the United
States Supreme Court in Boule v. City of Columbia5 7 proclaimed that "[i]f a
state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law,
it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause
from achieving the same result by judicial construction. 58
Several state courts interpret this language in Boule as prohibiting retroac-
us to construe a viable fetus as a 'person' for the purposes of imposing civil liability while refusing to
give it a similar classification in the criminal context.").
49. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 76, 95 (1820). For a discussion of the histor-
ical development of the rule, see Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARv. L.
REv. 748 (1935). See also Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71
VA. L. REV. 189, 198 (1985) (concluding that the rule was created by 18th century English judges to
stem the "vast and irrational proliferation of capital offenses.").
50. 3 N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.03 (Sands 4th ed. 1986).
51. State v. Spencer, 276 N.C. 535, 547, 173 S.E.2d 765, 773 (1970).
52. Id., 173 S.E.2d at 774 (citing 7 STRONG's N.C. INDEX 2D, Statutes § 10).
53. See infra text accompanying note 59.
54. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 633, 470 P.2d 617, 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 490
(1970).
55. U.S. CNST. art. I, § 10.
56. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 102 (2d ed. 1986).
57. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
58. Id. at 353-54. Bouie involved the trespass conviction of a "sit-in" participant under a South
Carolina statute forbidding "entry upon the lands of another ... after notie ... prohibiting such
entry." Id. at 348, 351-52. Although Bouie entered the premises without the required notice, the
state court affirmed the conviction by construing the statute to encompass "the act of remaining on
the premises of another after receiving notice to leave." Id. at 350. The Supreme Court reversed,
stressing that prior cases construing the statute "uniformly emphasized the notice-before-entry re-
quirement, and gave not the slightest indication that the requirement could be satisfied by proof of
the different act of remaining on the land after being told to leave." Id. at 356-57. The Court
explained that when an "unforeseeable state-court construction of a criminal statute is applied retro-
actively to subject a person to criminal liability for past conduct, the effect is to deprive him of due
process of law in the sense of fair warning that his contemplated conduct constitutes a crime." Id. at
354-55. The Court added that "[a]pplication of this rule is particularly compelling where, as here,
the petitioners' conduct cannot be deemed improper or immoral." Id. at 362.
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tive rejection of the born alive rule absent legislative direction to the contrary.5 9
In Keeler v. Superior Court,6° for example, the California Supreme Court ex-
amined the common law of California and other states and concluded that judi-
cial construction of the state murder statute to include the killing of an unborn
child "would not have been foreseeable."' 61 Relying on Boule, the court held
that rejection of the born alive rule would deny Keeler due process of law.62
At least one commentator has criticized this concept of "lawyer's notice,"
stating that "[iun the great run of cases, the picture of a citizen relying to his or
her detriment on highly technical legal sources is simply not credible." 63 Nev-
ertheless, the Bouie court alluded to an objective "lawyer's notice" standard
when it stated that "[tihe determination whether a criminal statute provides fair
warning... must be made on the basis of the statute itself and the other perti-
nent law, rather than on the basis of an ad hoc appraisal of the subjective expec-
tations of particular defendants." 6
Yet another rationale relied upon by courts that have retained the born
alive rule is legislative intent. Several courts have concluded that because the
common-law rule predated the enactment of the homicide statute in question,
the legislature intended to retain the rule when it enacted the statute.65 When
construing a vehicular homicide statute in State v. Amaro,66 for example, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he born-alive rule was well
established at common law.., by the time [the statute] was enacted in 1950."67
The court reasoned "that the Legislature would have expressly deviated from
the common-law born-alive meaning of 'person' had it meant to do so."16 8
Other courts look to the statutory scheme of the state's penal code to deter-
59. See, eg., Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 633-34, 470 P.2d 617, 625-26, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 481, 489-90 (1970), superseded by statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988); State v.
Anonymous, 40 Conn. Supp. 498, 503-04, 516 A.2d 156, 159 (1986); State v. Trudell, 243 Kan. 29,
36, 755 P.2d 511, 516 (1988); State v. Willis, 98 N.M. 771, 772, 652 P.2d 1222, 1223 (N.M. Ct. App.
1982).
60. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970). The state charged Keeler with the
murder of an eight-month-old fetus after he allegedly assaulted his estranged wife by repeatedly
kicking her in the abdomen while proclaiming: "I'm going to stomp it out of you." Id. at 623-24,
470 P.2d at 618-19, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83.
61. Id. at 639, 470 P.2d at 630, 87 Cal. Rtpr. at 494. Although no previous California case had
adopted the born alive rule explicitly, one case had suggested it when holding that the killing of an
unborn child in the process of being born was murder. See id. at 636-38, 470 P.2d at 628-29, 87 Cal.
Rptr. at 492-93, (discussing People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947)).
62. Id. at 639, 470 P.2d at 630, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 494. The court recognized that the defendant's
conduct was "certainly 'improper' and 'immoral,"' but stressed that "the guarantee of due process
extends to violent as well as peaceful men." Id. at 635, 470 P.2d at 627, 87 Cal. Rptr at 491; cf.
supra note 58 (noting Boule Court's observation that the rule prohibiting unforeseeable construction
of penal statutes is particularly compelling when defendant's conduct cannot be deemed improper or
immoral).
63. Jeffries, supra note 49, at 230.
64. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 355-56 n.5 (1964).
65. See, eg., Keeler, 2 Cal. 3d at 628, 470 P.2d at 622, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 486; People v. Greer, 79
Ill. 2d 103, 116, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (1980); State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257, 1259 (R.I. 1982).
66. 448 A.2d 1257 (R.I. 1982).
67. Id. at 1259.
68. Id.
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mine legislative intent. In Hollis v. Commonwealth 69 the Kentucky Supreme
Court concluded that rejection of the born alive rule would run "afoul of the
well-recognized rule of statutory construction that 'the specific statute controls a
more general statute.' "70 Accordingly, the defendant's violent conduct result-
ing in the miscarriage of his estranged wife's unborn child was punishable by the
abortion statute, not the murder statute.71 The Hollis court noted that a crimi-
nal abortion covered "any 'act ... producing the premature expulsion of the
fetus.' "72 The court emphasized that the gravamen of the Kentucky abortion
statute "is the act causing the delivery of the fetus, not the method of deliv-
ery."' 7 3 Because the murder and abortion statutes were enacted contemporane-
ously, the court reasoned that "the legislature intended conduct directed to
cause the unlawful abortion of a fetus ... to be punished under the abortion
statute."74
In Beale the North Carolina Supreme Court touched upon the various ra-
tionales supporting maintenance of the born alive rule, but did not rest its deci-
sion on any one proposition. The court began by noting that section 14-17 of the
North Carolina General Statutes75 codified the common-law definition of mur-
der, which did not include the killing of a viable but unborn child.76 The court
then examined the decisions of the minority of jurisdictions that have rejected
the born alive rule, emphasizing that the holdings in each case were prospective
only.7 7 With little discussion, the court chose to join "the overwhelming major-
ity of courts which have considered the issue and concluded that the killing of a
viable but unborn child is not murder under the common law."'78
In the Beale court's view, the legislature determined the punishment for the
69. 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983). In Hollis defendant was charged with the murder of a fetus
carried by his estranged wife. Id. at 61. The State alleged that Hollis told his wife that "he did not
want a baby" and then forcefully aborted the fetus. Id.
70. Id. at 64.
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.720 (Michie 1983)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 64-65; see also State v. Anonymous, 40 Conn. Supp. 498, 502, 516 A.2d 156, 158
(1986) ("The fact that the legislature would refer to an 'unborn child' in [the criminal abortion
statute] and not in the [murder statute] is strongly persuasive that the legislature did not intend an
'unborn child' to be a 'person' in the murder statute."); cf State v. Wickstrom, 405 N.W.2d 1 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (affirming criminal abortion conviction of defendant whose battery of pregnant wo-
man caused death of fetus).
75. In pertinent part, § 14-17 provides:
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment,
starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing...
shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree, and any person who commits such murder
shall be punished with death or imprisonment.., for life as the court shall determine....
All other kinds of murder... shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and any person
who commits such murder shall be punished as a Class C felon.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1989).
76. Beale, 324 N.C. at 89, 376 S.E.2d at 2 (citing Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470
P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970)); cf. supra text accompanying note 65 (discussing the legislative
intent rationale for maintaining the born alive rule).
77. Beale, 324 N.C. at 90-92, 376 S.E.2d at 2-3.
78. Id. at 92, 376 S.E.2d at 3 (citations omitted).
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destruction of a fetus when it created the crime of abortion. 79 The court noted
that the legislature previously had amended both the abortion and murder stat-
utes, but observed that "[n]othing in any of the statutes or amendments shows a
clear legislative intent to change the common law rule that the killing of a viable
but unborn child is not murder."80 To buttress its conclusion, the court stressed
that "[c]riminal statutes must be strictly construed."81 Writing for the court,
Justice Frye summarized by stating that "[in] view of the action previously
taken by the legislature and considering the weight of authority in other jurisdic-
tions on this question, we believe that any extension of the crime of murder... is
best left to the discretion and wisdom of the legislature."'8 2
When carefully scrutinized, it appears that the Beale court failed to apply a
complete analysis. The court began by noting that North Carolina's murder
statute, section 14-17, neither defines the term "murder," nor identifies potential
victims of the crime.83 The court then observed that the common-law definition
of murder did not include the killing of a viable fetus. 84 At this point, however,
the court ended its examination of section 14-17. The court never discussed the
purpose of the statute, a necessary inquiry even under the rule of strict
construction.8 5
If the court had examined the purpose of section 14-17, which is to punish
the unlawful killing of human beings, it might have reached a different result.
As one commentator stated, "[a] homicide statute protects all human beings.
To construe a homicide statute in such a manner as to exclude an entire class of
human beings is to defeat the intention of the legislature." 86
79. Id. at 92, 376 S.E.2d at 4 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-44 (1986)); cf supra notes 69-74
and accompanying text (discussing Hollis).
Specifically, § 14-44 provides:
If any person shall willfully administer to any woman, either pregnant or quick with child,
or prescribe for any such woman or advise or procure any such woman to take any
medicine, drug or other substance whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument or
other means with intent thereby to destroy such child, he shall be punished as a Class H
felon.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-44 (1986). As a Class H felony, violation of§ 14-44 is "punishable by impris-
onment up to 10 years, or a fine or both." Id. § 14-1.1(a)(8). Section 14-45.1 restricts § 14-44 by
providing that "it shall not be unlawful, during the first 20 weeks of a woman's pregnancy, to advise,
procure, or cause a miscarriage or abortion" when the procedure meets certain requirements. Id.
§ 14-45.1(a). Additionally, § 14-45.1 authorizes abortions after the twentieth week "if there is sub-
stantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would threaten the life or gravely impair the health of
the woman." Id. § 14-45.1(b).
80. Beale, 324 N.C. at 93, 376 S.E.2d at 4. In a revealing footnote, the court also noted that
"[a] bill creating the crime of feticide and making it 'punishable to the same extent as if the defend-
ant's conduct had caused the death of the mother,' was introduced in the 1985 Session of the Gen-
eral Assembly but was not enacted into law." Id. at 93 n.4, 376 S.E.2d at 4 n.4. For a discussion of
the 1985 bill and other legislative attempts to ameliorate the common-law rule, see infra notes 116-
131 and accompanying text.
81. Beale, 324 N.C. at 93, 376 S.E.2d at 4 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the rule of
strict construction, see supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
82. Beale, 324 N.C. at 93, 376 S.E.2d at 4.
83. Id. at 89, 376 S.E.2d at 1.
84. Id. at 89, 376 S.E.2d at 2.
85. See State v. Spencer, 276 N.C. 535, 547, 173 S.E.2d 765, 773 (1970); supra text accompany-
ig notes 51-52.
86. Forsythe, supra note 1, at 610. Forsythe concludes that "[tihe application of a homicide
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In DiDonato v. Wortman 87 the court defined the term "person" to include a
viable but unborn child under North Carolina's wrongful death statute88 In
Beale, however, the court disregarded the language of its prior decision, choos-
ing instead to invoke summarily the rule of strict construction even though re-
jection of the born alive rule would advance the purpose of the murder statute.89
The court ignored the irony that Mrs. Beale, had she survived, could have recov-
ered monetary damages for the baby's death, but could not have obtained crimi-
nal punishment against her husband.
Although it is true that the common-law born alive rule was well estab-
lished when the North Carolina General Assembly first enacted the predecessor
to section 14-17, 90 the rule was based on the inability of existing medical science
to prove the corpus delicti of murder.91 Because recent advancements in medical
technology have eradicated the evidentiary basis of the rule,92 and the court has
construed the term "person" to include a viable fetus, the court reasonably could
have construed section 14-17 to encompass the killing of a viable fetus. Such a
construction would not violate the rule of strict construction, as rejection of the
born alive rule would have advanced the purpose of the murder statute.
If, however, the Beale court had rejected the born alive rule through judi-
cial construction, the decision would have raised the due process concerns ad-
dressed in Keeler v. Superior Court.93 On its face, the Keeler ex post facto
rationale comports with the due process language of Bouie v. City of Columbia.94
The facts of both Keeler and Beale, however, render unrealistic any assertion
that the defendants failed to receive fair warning that their actions were crimi-
nal. To reach such a conclusion on the facts in Beale, one would have to assume
that the defendant had studied Coke and Blackstone, as well as the common law
of at least twenty-five states, and had concluded that his conduct in shooting his
pregnant wife in the head would result in only one murder conviction rather
than two. 95
Although the criticisms of "lawyer's notice" aimed at Keeler 96 apply as
well to Beale, the Constitution guarantees every criminal defendant fair warning
that her conduct is criminal.9 7 Nevertheless, when applied to Beale, the Boule
standard is inconclusive. At the time of Beale's conduct, the statute itself did
statute to an unborn child is thus itself a strict construction, an application of the very letter of a
homicide statute to encompass a human being." Id. at 609.
87. 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987).
88. Id. at 426-28, 358 S.E.2d at 491-92 (construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984)); see
supra text accompanying note 42.
89. See Beale, 324 N.C. at 93, 376 S.E.2d at 4.
90. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 85, 1893 N.C. Session Laws 76.
91. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
93. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970), superseded by statute, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 187 (1988); see supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing Keeler).
94. 378 U.S. 347 (1964); see supra text accompanying notes 56-58 (discussing Boule).
95. Cf. Jeffries, supra note 49, at 229 (making a similar observation about defendant in Keeler).
96. See supra text accompanying note 63.
97. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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not define the crime of murder,98 and no North Carolina case had adopted the
born alive rule explicitly. Although a look at the "other pertinent law"9 9 would
have revealed that most states still accepted the common-law rule, at least two
states had rejected the rule by judicial construction. 100 Beale, however, was a
case of first impression in North Carolina. Because Bouie at least implicitly con-
templates settled law,10 1 it is unclear whether construing the murder statute to
include the killing of a viable fetus would have violated Beale's due process
rights. In any event, the Beale court could have done so without violating
Beale's due process rights by applying the decision prospectively. 102
Viewed in isolation, section 14-17 could have been construed to encompass
the killing of a viable but unborn child. The court must not take such an iso-
lated view, however; it must construe a statute with respect to other relevant
statutes. The Beale court failed to mention a rule of statutory construction sup-
porting its decision: "It is ... well settled that statutes dealing with the same
subject matter must be construed in pari materia 10 3 and harmonized to give
effect to each other." 1°4 This harmonization requires that "[w]here one statute
deals with a subject in detail with reference to a particular situation ... and
another statute deals with the same subject in general and comprehensive terms
. . . the particular statute will be construed as controlling in the particular
situation."105
Although not mentioned by the Beale court, the principle of construing
statutes in pari materia supports the ultimate result, which "avoided injecting
the law of homicide into the criminal regulation of abortion." 10 6 Although the
murder statute punishes the unlawful killing of "human beings," which could be
construed to include a viable fetus, the Beale court recognized that "[tlhe legisla-
ture has considered the question of intentionally destroying a fetus and deter-
mined the punishment therefor." 10 7 Section 14-44 addresses the specific
98. See supra note 75; cf. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) ("When a statute
on its face is vague or overbroad, it at least gives a potential defendant some notice ... that a
question may arise as to its coverage, and that it may be held to cover his contemplated conduct.").
99. See supra text accompanying note 64.
100. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
101. Cf. Boute, 378 U.S. at 354 ("If a judicial construction ... is 'unexpected and indefensible by
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue,' it must not be given
retroactive effect.") (quoting J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (1960)).
102. In that regard, the Boute court stated that "while [an ex post facto] construction is of course
valid for the future, it may not be applied retroactively." Id. at 362; see also Commonwealth v. Cass,
392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984) (prospectively applying judicial construction of vehicular
homicide statute to encompass viable fetis); State v. Home, 282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984)
(prospective application of decision to include viable fetus as victim of murder).
103. "Upon the same matter or subject." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979).
104. State v. Williams, 291 N.C. 442, 445-46, 230 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1976).
105. State v. Leeper, 59 N.C. App. 199, 202, 296 S.E.2d 7, 9, cert. denied, 307 N.C. 272, 299
S.E.2d 218 (1982).
106. Jeffries, supra note 49, at 232. In Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983), the
Kentucky Supreme Court suggested that the criminal abortion statute was intended to punish any
destruction of a viable unborn child, with or without the mother's consent. Id. at 65; see supra notes
69-74 and accompanying text. In contrast, Professor Jeffries argues that the California legislature,
when it enacted the abortion statute, intended to punish consensual abortions less severely than
murder. See Jeffries, supra note 49, at 232.
107. Beale, 324 N.C. at 92, 376 S.E.2d at 4.
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situation in which a fetus is destroyed intentionally, whereas section 14-17 ad-
dresses the killing of human beings in general terms. Construing sections 14-17
and 14-44 in pari materia, section 14-44 must control in the more specific situa-
tion when a viable fetus is killed. 10 8 Construction of the murder statute to en-
compass the killing of an unborn child would transform the crime of intentional
destruction of a fetus, punishable by a prison term of up to ten years,10 9 into a
capital offense. 110 As the Beale court stated, "[t]he creation and expansion of
criminal offenses is the prerogative of the legislative branch of government."' 11
Because the General Assembly treated intentional destruction of a fetus less se-
verely than murder when it enacted the abortion statute, "interpretation of the
murder statute to reach abortion of a viable fetus would have been not only
unwise, but also invasive of legislative choice."' 12
Although an emotional reaction to the facts of Beale dictates rejection of
the born alive rule in favor of severe punishment, the court is not free to ignore
well-established rules of statutory construction. Admittedly, it stretches credu-
lity to compare Beale's violent behavior with a mother's choice to abort her
viable fetus, 11 3 particularly in light of the mother's constitutional right to abort
prior to viability. 114 Nevertheless, the born alive rule cannot be eradicated by
judicial construction because redefining murder to include the killing of a viable
fetus would conflict with the legislative prerogative to punish unlawful abortions
less severely than murder. Thus, until the General Assembly responds with ap-
propriate legislation, violence against the unborn will be punished inadequately,
if punished at all. 115 Accordingly, the legislature should enact such legislation
as quickly as politically possible.
In drafting a statute to create crimes against the unborn, the General As-
sembly will have to confront several issues from the outset. The existing statutes
of several states may serve as models to address these difficult issues. An exami-
nation of this existing legislation reveals a variety of approaches and attendant
problems. 116
108. Beale originally was indicted for the killing of the fetus under § 14-44. See supra note 9; cf.
State v. Wickstrom, 405 N.W.2d I (Minn. App. 1987) (construing statute making it "unlawful to
willfully perform an abortion" to encompass destruction of fetus resulting from battery to mother).
109. See supra note 79 (discussing North Carolina's criminal abortion statute).
110. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1988). As Professor Jeffries noted when analyzing the deci-
sion in Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970), "absent
wholesale judicial construction of the statutory text, induced abortion by the mother of a viable but
unborn 'human being' or by someone acting with her consent would have been punishable as mur-
der." Jeffries, supra note 49, at 232. Moreover, interpretation of the statute to "depend on the
consent of the mother.., would have been to attribute to the statute a meaning that its text would
not bear." Id. at 233.
111. Beale, 324 N.C. at 92, 376 S.E.2d at 4 (emphasis added).
112. Jeffries, supra note 49, at 232.
113. Cf. Hollis v. C6mmonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61, 67 (Ky. 1983) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting)
("The only similarity between abortion and the [intentional destruction of the fetus by the father] is
that an unborn child was involved.").
114. See infra note 129 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
115. Cf. People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226, 237-38, 293 N.W.2d 775, 780-81 (1980)
("Although we find that the 'born alive' rule is archaic and should be abolished... the abolition of
the rule is a matter for action by the Legislature.").
116. For a detailed examination of legislative repeals of the born alive rule, see Parness, Crimes
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The drafter must first determine the scope of protection to be afforded the
unborn under the criminal law. In that regard, some states take a narrow ap-
proach, choosing only to punish the intentional or willful killing of a fetus. The
California legislature, for example, amended its murder statute to define the
crime as "the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice afore-
thought." 117 Other states have achieved the same result by creating a distinct
crime, often labelled "feticide," which outlaws the killing of an unborn child
resulting from injury to the mother.1 18
By focusing only on intentional or willful acts, however, the narrow ap-
proach fails to protect the unborn from less culpable conduct. For example,
although the California Penal Code includes a fetus as a potential victim of mur-
der, 1 9 it does not include a fetus within the narrow class of potential victims of
lesser offenses such as manslaughter. 120 Recognizing this deficiency, other states
have enacted comprehensive statutes detailing specific crimes against the un-
born. Minnesota, for example, has enacted a statute entitled: "Crimes Against
Unborn Children," 12' which includes murder, manslaughter, and assault, in va-
rying degrees. 12 2
The drafter of a statute addressing violence against the unborn also must
determine the class of victims to be protected. The new law might encompass
injury to unborn children from the point of conception, the point of viability, or
some point in between. For example, the definitional section accompanying
Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the Potentiality of Human Life, 22 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 97 (1985).
117. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) (emphasis added).
118. Such crimes are usually punishable as manslaughter. See, eg., FLA. STAr. § 782.09 (1976);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.210 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-23-5 (1981). In contrast, Georgia pun-
ishes the offense of "feticide" by "imprisonment for life." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1988).
Representative Frank W. Ballance, Jr., unsuccessfully introduced a bill of this type into the
North Carolina House of Representatives during the 1985 session of the North Carolina General
Assembly. If enacted, the proposed bill would have created the following new section:
§ 14-17.2. Feticide.
(a) Offense. A person is guilty of feticide if, other than in the course of a lawful
abortion pursuant to G.S. 14-45.1, he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or under cir-
cumstances set forth in G.S. 20-141.4 causes the death of a fetus that, at the time of its
death, would have been capable of sustained life outside the mother's womb. A fetus is
presumed to be capable of sustained life outside the mother's womb six months or more
after the date of its conception.
(b) Punishment. Feticide is punishable to the same extent as if the defendant's con-
duct had caused the death of the mother.
H.R. 1276, 135th N.C. Gen. Assembly (1985).
119. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988); supra text accompanying note 117.
120. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (defining manslaughter as "the unlawful killing of a human
being without malice"). For a discussion of the "manslaughter gap" in California, see Comment,
Feticide in California: A Proposed Statutory Scheme, 12 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 723, 725-29 (1979).
121. Act of March 21, 1986, ch. 388, §§ 1-17, 1986 Minn. Laws 549-56.
122. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266 to -.268 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990). The Illinois Gen-
eral Assembly recently adopted a similar comprehensive statutory scheme. See 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv.
PA 84-1414 § 1 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, It 9-1.2, 9-2.1, 9-3.2, 12-3.1 & 12-4.4 (Supp.
1989)) (creating crimes of intentional homicide, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter,
reckless homicide, battery, and aggravated battery of an unborn child); see also AIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1103(A)(5) (1989) (defining "manslaughter" to include "[k]nowingly or recklessly caus-
ing the death of an unborn child.., by any physical injury to the mother").
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Minnesota's crimes against unborn children defines an "unborn child" as "the
unborn offspring of a human being conceived, but not yet born." 12 3
In contrast to Minnesota's specificity, California's murder statute merely
prohibits the unlawful killing of "a fetus" without further explanation. 124 In
People v. Smith 125 the California Court of Appeals narrowed the class of pro-
tected victims by construing the statutory term "fetus" "to refer to a viable un-
born child." 126 The Smith court thus rejected a murder charge based on an
assault on the mother that resulted in the death of a previable fetus. 127 The
court interpreted Roe v. Wade 128 as a constitutional prohibition against includ-
ing a previable fetus as a victim of murder. 129 Although scholars uniformly
reject the Smith court's reliance on Roe,130 legislators drafting statutes in this
area should be cognizant of its potential precedential value. To avoid the Smith
result, legislation designed to protect previable fetuses should specify its in-
tended scope clearly. Similarly, legislation intended to protect only viable fe-
tuses should define viability.131
To avoid infringing upon a mother's constitutional right to abort a preg-
nancy prior to viability, 132 the new legislation also should exclude explicitly con-
123. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266(a) (West 1987); see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1.2(b) (Supp.
1989) ("'unborn child' shall mean any individual of the human species from fertilization until
birth").
124. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988).
125. 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976).
126. Id. at 759, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
127. Id. at 754-55, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
128. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
129. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 756-57, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502-03; see also Hollis v. Common-
wealth, 652 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Ky. 1983) (Relying on Roe, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the
state's interest in the life of a fetus is not sufficiently compelling to support criminal sanctions until
the fetus is viable.). The United States Supreme Court summarized its holding in Roe v. Wade as
follows:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's
attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State,
in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abor-
tion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgement, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
130. Scholars generally agree that Roe merely proscribes certain restrictions on a woman's con-
stitutional right to abort a pregnancy prior to viability. See Forsythe, supra note 1, at 616-17; Par-
ness, supra note 116, at 97; Comment, Feticide in Illinois: Legislative Amelioration of a Common
Law Rule, 4 N. ILL. U.L. Rnv. 91, 100-02 (1983). Therefore, the Roe rationale does not govern
nonconsensual conduct of third parties that results in the death of a fetus. Because the assaults in
Smith and Hollis did not involve a woman's fundamental right to privacy, these cases should not
implicate Roe. Forsythe, supra note I, at 616-18.
131. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[v]iability is reached when, in the judg-
ment of the attending physician on the particular facts before him, there is a reasonable likelihood of
the fetus' sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support." Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388 (1979).
132. Cf Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (1973) (summarizing the state's ability to regulate abortions);
see supra note 129.
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duct resulting in the destruction of a fetus when the pregnant mother consents.
The California murder statute, for example, prohibits prosecution if "[t]he act
was solicited, aided, abetted, or consented to by the mother of the fetus." 133
Similarly, the legislature must be wary of potential conflict with the abortion
statute. 134 One commentator suggests that to prevent "the word 'abortion' from
being artfully used to include any termination of a pregnancy which might result
from violent acts of third parties," the legislature should amend the abortion
statute to define "abortion" as any termination of pregnancy to which the
mother consented. 135
In light of the above discussion, this Note proposes that the North Carolina
General Assembly adopt comprehensive legislation, patterned after the Minne-
sota scheme, 136 covering crimes against the unborn. The new crimes should
include murder as well as a range of lesser included offenses. The statute also
should define expressly the class of protected victims, and should indicate specif-
ically that a previable fetus is to be included. Such legislation would prevent the
Beale result and enable North Carolina to punish those who commit crimes
against the unborn.
GARY V. PERKO
133. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(b)(3) (West 1988); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266(b)
(West 1987) (excluding prosecution of "the pregnant woman"). In California, however, the consent
exception to the murder statute does not preclude prosecution "under any other provision of law."
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(c) (West 1988).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
135. See Forsythe, supra note 1, at 622.
136. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. The General Assembly considered a feti-
cide bill in 1985, but failed to enact it. See supra note 118. This bill, however, would have punished
only the intentional killing of a fetus.
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